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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: EASING THE
TENSION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS
JAmEs D. HOPKINS*
I
Although of ancient vintage, the writ of habeas corpus, embedded
in our legal system by the Federal Constitution,' was not specifically
defined by that document. Indeed, it remained for Congress and the
courts to determine its proper function. Inasmuch as the constitutional
provision appeared in article I, which established the form and powers
of the Congress, it might have been urged that the intention of the
framers was directed toward the actions of the federal government
alone.2 However, both the fourteenth amendment, declaring that
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, 3
and the supremacy clause, stating that the Constitution and the laws
made thereunder are the supreme law of the land, binding the judges
in every state and superseding any state constitution or law to the con-
trary,4 have nullified that construction. The ancient writ thus emerged
as a viable instrument for the effectuation of these constitutional
mandates.
*Justice, New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 2d Department. A.B., Co-
lumbia University, 1931; LL.B., Columbia University, 1933.
This article is based on the panel discussion on the same subject before the Appel-
late Judges' Conference of the Section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar
Association at the convention held at Dallas, Texas, on August 9, 1969. The panel
members were Louis H. Burke, Justice of the Supreme Court of California, Floyd R.
Gibson, Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Stanley A. Weigel, Judge
of the District Court, Northern District of California, and the author. I am deeply in-
debted to the members of the panel for their contributions to the discussion, upon which
this article largely depends. They are not bound, however, for any of the views ex-
pressed herein, for which I take complete responsibility.
I U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9. It is the only form of process mentioned in the Constitution.
The Constitution of the State of New York has a similar provision. See N.Y. CONSr. art.
I, § 4.
2 The argument is strengthened by the provisions of section 10 of article I of the
Constitution, dealing with the limitations of the powers of the states. No prohibition
against the suspension of the writ by a state is made, even though other kinds of state
action are specifically forbidden, i.e., bills of attainder, ex post facto legislation, or a law
impairing the obligation of contract.
8 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 4.
4 US. CONSr. art. VI, § 2.
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II
Although proposed to the states two years earlier, the fourteenth
amendment did not come into force until 1868. In the interim, Con-
gress conferred upon the federal courts habeas corpus jurisdiction
over state prisoners,5 whereas previously the federal judiciary had been
empowered to issue the writ only for the benefit of federal applicants.6
Today, the federal statute broadly extends the power of the writ to
"the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any
circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions" when the prisoner
is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States. . . ,,s Despite this expansive language, a question
of interpretation inevitably arises - a question which perennially at-
tends the enforcement of federal rights on the state level: What federal
rights survive a final judgment of conviction in a state court, where
federal claims were asserted by the defendant and adjudicated against
him? Or to put it differently, and perhaps more correctly, to what
degree may the federal courts review a state court conviction through
the use of the writ of habeas corpus?
Several important considerations underlie this question of inter-
pretation. First, it is undoubtedly true that the federal courts, under
the constitutional analysis of power heretofore discussed, could, as a
pure exercise of sovereignty, utilize habeas corpus to review a state
criminal conviction whenever a non-frivolous federal claim is asserted
by the affected prisoner. Second, the exercise of this power bears the
sobering weight of the relative strains between the states and the cen-
tral government; there are occasions when the accommodation of the
several systems within the Union reflects a call for discretion. Third,
the pragmatic need for the most efficient use of judicial manpower
and legal process is a particularly demanding interest in a society
where the volume of litigation is rapidly increasing. Fourth, great
weight has recently been placed upon the evident benefits arising from
the uniform enforcement of federal rights throughout the states.9
Fifth, the vitality of the widely accepted principle that the criminal
law ought to be swiftly and certainly enforced may be impeded by
the increasing availability of habeas corpus relief.10
5 14 Stat. 385 (1869).
6 Cf. Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845). See generally Bell, State Courts
and the Federal System, 21 VAIJD. L. REv. 949, 951-53 (1969).
728 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1964).
81d. § 2241(c)(3) (1964).
9 Cf. Hopkins, The Formation of Rules: A Preliminary Theory of Deision, 35
BROoKL"zN L. Ray. 165, 168-69 (1969).
10 This consideration, and others, are discussed in Bator, Finality in Criminal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. Rv. 441 (1963).
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The reconciliation of these somewhat conflicting objectives by
the federal judiciary has resulted in a rule which, while affording rec-
ognition to the legitimate interests of state legal processes, compels
obeisance to the supremacy of the federal system in the determination
of the scope and content of federal rights. The development of this
rule has, of course, produced tensions in its wake between the federal
and state judicial systems. The purpose of this article is to examine
the nature of these tensions and consider the means by which they
may be ameliorated.
III
While federal judges have utilized habeas corpus to oversee state
criminal convictions since 1923,11 this process did not assume extensive
proportions until Brown v. Alien 12 was decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1953. The Brown Court held that state adjudica-
tions of federal claims could not be accepted as binding by the federal
courts, i.e., that an alleged violation of a federal constitutional right
must be appraised by a federal tribunal independently of the findings
of the state court. As the Court noted, "[i]n determining whether a
confession has been used by the state in violation of the constitutional
rights of a petitioner, a United States court appraises the alleged abuses
by the facts as shown at the hearing or admitted on the record."'13 Ten
years later, in the companion cases of Fay v. Noia'4 and Townsend v.
Sain,'5 the Court formulated a definitive rule which may be synthesized
as follows: the remedy of habeas corpus may be invoked, after the ex-
haustion of available state remedies, to consider violations of federal
constitutional rights in state criminal proceedings which result in
judgments of conviction, notwithstanding any state determination of
those rights.' 6 And a full evidentiary hearing must be held by the
federal district court under any of the following conditions: (1) where
the merits of a factual dispute were not determined at the state hear-
ing; (2) where the state determination is not fairly supported by the
record; (3) where the fact-finding procedure used by the state court
is not adequate for a full and fair hearing; (4) where there is a substan-
1l Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), held that the federal district judge must
make a factual examination of the state prisoner's claim that his trial would be lacking
in due process because of the influence of a mob. Cf. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309
(1915), where a similar claim was dismissed because the state processes were said to be
adequate remedies.
12 344 US. 443 (1953).
13 Id. at 475.
14 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
15 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
16 Id. at 312.
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tial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) where the facts
were not adequately developed at the state court hearing; or (6) where,
for any reason, it appears that the state court did not afford the pris-
oner a full and fair hearing.17 However, even under Noia and Town-
send, a habeas applicant is still deemed to have waived his federal
claims if he
understandably and knowingly forwent the privilege of seeking to
vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for stra-
tegic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as
the deliberate by-passing of state procedure .... 18
The potential effects of the Noia-Townsend rule' 9 were aptly dem-
onstrated even before its promulgation in 1963. For example, in the
related cases of People v. Wade20 and People v. Kiernan,21 two non-
convicts, were accused of participating in a jail break in which both a
policeman and a jail guard were killed. They were convicted of first
degree murder in 1942 and sentenced to life imprisonment. At their
trial the defendants repudiated and contested, on the ground of coer-
cion, the confessions implicating them in the crime. The jury, of
course, implicitly rejected their contentions, and, although the same
point was raised on appeal, the appellate division affirmed the convic-
tion.2 2 Initially, Wade alone appealed, again raising the same claim.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction,23 and a sub-
sequent application for certiorari was denied by the United States
Supreme Court.24
In 1955, Wade's application for coram nobis relief, alleging that
the prosecution had suppressed evidence at his trial, was denied by
the appellate division and shortly thereafter his petition for a writ
17 Id. at 313.
183 72 US. at 439 (emphasis added). Later in 1963, the Supreme Court held in
Sanders v. United States, 373 US. 1 (1963), that the doctrine of res judicata does not
apply to successive habeas corpus petitions and that the court should dispose of each
petition in the exercise of discretion, through which the denial of an earlier petition
based on the ground now presented may be considered.
19The rule has been substantially codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1964). It is not
necessary for the petitioner to have raised the daim of a federal right in the appeal
from the judgment of conviction, the constitutional violation may first be submitted in
the petition under the statute. Kaufman v. United States, 394 US. 217 (1969).
20 291 N.Y. 574, 50 N.E2d 660 (1943), reargument denied, 292 N.Y. 577, 54 N.E2d 693
(1944).
216 N.Y.2d 274, 160 N.E.2d 503, 189 N.YS.2d 215 (1959).
22 People v. Wade, 265 App. Div. 867, 88 N.Y.S.2d 369 (2d Dep't 1942); People v.
Kiernan, 265 App. Div. 866, 38 N.Y.S.2d 370 (2d Dep't 1942).
23 People v. Wade, 291 N.Y. 574, 50 N.E.2d 660 (1943), reargument denied, 292 N.Y.
577, 54 N.E.2d 693 (1944).
24NV'ade v. New York, 320 U.S. 789 (1943), reh'g denied, 320 U.S. 815 (1944).
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of certiorari was similarly denied by the Supreme Court.2 5 He then
addressed two petitions to the federal district court, contending that
his federal right of due process had been violated by both the sup-
pression of evidence 26 and the utilization of the coerced confession.27
Neither he nor the state introduced any new evidence with respect to
the coerced confession claim, and the district court denied both peti-
tions. However, on appeal, the writ was sustained, and Wade was dis-
charged from custody.28 The Second Circuit found, on the facts as
revealed by the trial record, that the confession had been coerced,
and that, absent the confession, the evidence was insufficient to sustain
conviction.
A further confrontation between the state and federal courts
followed on Kiernan's appeal, taken some years after Wade's. Despite
Wade's success in his habeas corpus proceeding, Kiernan's appeal was
fruitless and his conviction affirmed by the New York Court of Ap-
peals.29 Moreover, Kiernan's application for certiorari to the Supreme
Court was denied, but with the significant addendum that it was
"without prejudice to an application for a writ of habeas corpus in
the appropriate United States District Court." 30 Kiernan, of course,
immediately commenced a habeas corpus proceeding in the appropri-
ate district court. Again, no new evidence relating to the validity of
the confession was introduced, and both the prisoner and the prosecu-
tion relied on the state trial record. The district court, finding no
distinction between Kiernan and Wade as to the facts in the record
concerning their confessions, and considering itself bound by the Sec-
ond Circuit's determination with regard to Wade, sustained the writ
of habeas corpus and discharged Kiernan.ai
Thus, a conviction of some sixteen years standing, well beyond
the reach of the appellate process, was annulled through the vindica-
25 Wade v. New York, 352 U.S. 974 (1957).
26 United States ex reL. Wade v. Jackson, 153 F. Supp. 781 (N.D.N.Y. 1957) (suppres-
sion of evidence petition).
27 United States ex reL. Wade v. Jackson, 144 F. Supp. 458 (N.D.N.Y. 1956) (coerced
confession petition).
28 United States ex rel. Wade v. Jackson, 256 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357
US. 908 (1958).
29 People v. Kiernan, 6 N.Y.2d 274, 160 N.E2.d 503, 189 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1959). The
conviction was unanimously affirmed. The opinion declared that a reading of the record
did not sustain a conclusion that Kiernan's statement was coerced. The opinion ends:
We do not regard the evidence as to the circumstances surrounding his confession
sufficient to hold that his confession was involuntary as a matter of law, and
the use thereof as evidence a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 275-76, 160 N.E.2d at 504, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
30 Kiernan v. New York, 363 U.S. 824 (1960).
3i United States ex reL. Kiernan v. La Vallee, 191 F. Supp. 455 (N.D.N.Y. 1961).
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tion of a federal right. It might be expected that profound disagree-
ment with the result, approaching the level of resentment, would have
been aroused in the states. First, usual practice looks to the review
of error within a comparatively short time after judgment, and a de-
viation from that practice presents elements of prejudice both to the
prisoner and to the community. Second, where the scope of the right
is the same under state and federal standards, the state's rejection of
a claim is a determination which would, unless it overlooked the re-
quirements of the standard, normally be final. In Wade and Kiernan,
for example, the New York rule measuring the admissibility of a con-
fession and denying force to a coerced confession is substantially the
same as the federal rule;32 yet, the federal court found that the common
standard had been violated-a conclusion contrary to that reached by
the New York courts on the same facts.33 Third, since the denial of
certiorari by the Supreme Court in the usual appellate process is usu-
ally regarded as at least some indication that the claim of violation
of the federal right was not crucial, the question arises whether the
federal system should undertake a second examination of the claim.
Fourth, and least significant, the notion of review, implying error, is
irksome to the court being reviewed. 34
All of these grounds of tension are undoubtedly inherent in any
setting which contemplates a coincidence of jurisdiction in separate
court systems over the same subject matter. Overlapping breeds con-
flict and irritation. The final word must inevitably be spoken by one
of the systems, and if it differs from the outcome arrived at by the
other, a questioning of the determination can be anticipated.85
3 2 One difference between the two exists in the effect to be given to a delay in ar-
raignment. New York treats the delay as one element to be considered by the trier of
fact in deciding the validity of the confession, People v. Snyder, 297 N.Y. 81, 74
N.E.2d 657 (1947); the federal courts may find the delay alone sufficient to impair the
confession, McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Upshaw v. United States, 335
U.S. 410 (1948). That factor was not, however, decisive in the reasoning of the federal
court.
33 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit laid emphasis on the length of the
questioning- some twenty-three hours, the failure of the prisoner to have food, in-
consistencies in statements made during the questioning, medical testimony concerning
injuries suffered by the prisoners, and declarations made by the prosecutor during his
summation which the court found were unsupported by the evidence. United States
ex rel. Wade v. United States, 256 F.2d 7, 12-14 (2d Cir. 1948).
34 As Finley Peter Dunne in his role as Mr. Dooley is said to have remarked, an ap-
peal is where one court is asked to show its contempt for another. Cf. United States
ex rel. Kiernan v. La Vallee, 191 F. Supp. 455, 456 (N.D.N.Y. 1961).
33 The depth of the questioning is reflected by the many articles on the subject.
See Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed .Civil Rights: Federal
Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trials, 113 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 793 (1965); Bator, supra note 10; Desmond, Federal and State Habeas Corpus:
How to Make Two Parallel Judicial Lines Meet, 49 A.B.A.J. 1166 (1963); Mayers, Federal
1970]
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The nature and severity of the questioning, however, can be tem-
pered when the two systems attempt to mitigate the tensions between
them, recognizing respective duties, the advantages which each has in
the disposition of cases, and the course of action which may mutually
be pursued to accommodate the objectives of a sound criminal process
within both systems.
IV
It would be incorrect to overstate the problem; and there is a
tendency to stress the exceptional and ignore the usual. The truth is
that federal intervention in state convictions has not led to a wholesale
reversal of state convictions. As Mr. Justice Clark recognized, dissent-
ing in Fay v. Noia, only 1.4 percent of the petitions in habeas corpus
have resulted in the granting of any relief. 6 In Brown v. Allen, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter similarly noted that out of some 3,702 petitions
filed during a four-year period, only five had made out a case for the
discharge of the prisoner.37 Nevertheless, the paucity of success has
not discouraged state prisoners, and the filing of petitions in habeas
corpus has assumed increasing momentum. When Fay v. Noia was
decided in 1963, approximately 1,900 petitions were filed; in 1968
the number of petitions had risen to over 6,000, and during the latter
months of 1968 more petitions were filed than during the correspond-
ing period of the previous year.38
The burden of litigation which this influx of petitions has cast
upon the federal courts is enormous - even more so, if, under the rubrics
of Townsend v. Sain and Fay v. Noia, the state court procedures have
been found inadequate and evidentiary hearings become necessary.
Here, the ground of tension weighs heavily in favor of the federal
courts, for the burden of habeas corpus applications would be re-
duced, at least in part, by proper regard for constitutional procedures
in the state courts.
Review of State Convictions: The Need for Procedural Re-appraisal, 34 GEo. WASH. L
REv. 615 (1966); Meador, Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial Procedure, 52
VA. L. REv. 286 (1966); Meador, Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and Federal
Post Conviction Review, 50 A.BA.J. 928 (1964); Silver, The Supreme Court, the State
Judiciary and State Criminal Procedure: An Example of Uncreative Federalism, 41 ST.
JOHN'S L. Rxv. 331 (1967); Note, State Criminal Procedure and Federal Habeas Corpus,
80 HARv. L. REV. 422 (1966); Note, State Post Conviction Remedies and Federal Habeas
Corpus, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 154 (1965).
36 372 U.S. 391, 445 n.1 (1963).
37 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
88 1968 REPORT OF DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF UNITED STATES CouRTs 100.
It was noted also that in 1968 appeals by nonfederal prisoners increased by more than
one-third, so that there were more than 1200 cases on appeal in habeas corpus applica-
tions in the circuit courts of appeal.
[VoL. 44:660
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But the incorporation of federal constitutional protections into
state criminal systems has unquestionably contributed more heavily
to the burden thrust upon the federal courts than any other cause.
Each time the Supreme Court has announced a new doctrine binding
on the states, as in the cases of Mapp v. Ohio,39 Jackson v. Denno,40
Gideon v. Wainwright,41 and Stovall v. Denno,42 to cite but a few,
courts have been inundated with petitions seeking habeas corpus re-
lief based on that doctrine. Indeed, the experience of both state and
federal judges reveals that many prisoners file repetitive petitions which
frequently are contradictory in their statements of the facts upon which
relief is sought, or which omit allegations of vital facts which require
denial of preceding applications. As a customary procedure, an appli-
cation for post-conviction relief in the state system (whether by coram
nobis or habeas corpus) is made to the court of original jurisdiction,
followed by an appeal by the unsuccessful prisoner, a habeas corpus
application in the federal district court, and upon denial, review by
appeal in the federal system. Hence, discounting entirely the review
available through the appeal of the judgment of conviction, the pris-
oner's conviction, in a typical case, may receive the scrutiny of four
courts. The number is multiplied when the prisoner engages in separate
applications based on varying grounds.
The loss in judicial man hours occasioned by this circuitous and
time consuming procedure is incalculable. Yet, no panacea for the loss
has been suggested, nor is it likely that the duplication of effort can
be significantly reduced under prevailing procedures. A process lim-
ited exclusively to state courts runs counter to the supreme power of
the federal courts to assess and enforce claims of federal rights; a pro-
cess limited to the federal courts alone ignores the fact-finding deter-
minations in the state courts and, in addition, fails to recognize and
utilize available remedies at the state level. As has been declared by
the Supreme Court in Sanders v. United States,4 the principle of res
judicata does not warrant the denial of repetitive petitions out of hand.
Proposals, often advanced, that a time limit for the filing of habeas
corpus applications be imposed by statute, or that the prisoner be re-
quired to state in one petition all grounds for relief which are known
to him, or which could have been discovered with due diligence, seem
89 567 US. 643 (1961) (illegal search and seizure).
40 378 U.S. 268 (1964) (procedural requirements for admissibility of confession).
41372 US. 335 (1963) (right to counsel).
42 388 US. 293 (1967) (confrontation by witness).
43 373 US. 1 (1963).
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doomed under the constitutional provision that the writ may not,
under ordinary circumstances, be suspended.44
Nor is it likely that the ever-increasing load of petitions will be
diminished in the immediate future. Manifestly, the Supreme Court
has not retarded the pace at which federal criminal standards are be-
ing integrated into the state systems. Indeed, the prohibition against
the out-of-hand exclusion of jurors in trials involving the death penalty
for their disbelief in capital punishment,4 5 the right to the transcript
of the evidentiary hearing on appellate review,4 6 the application of
the double jeopardy clause in the fifth amendment,47 and the use of the
confession of a codefendant in the trial of several defendants jointly
indicted,48 are illustrative of the continued incorporation of federal
standards within recent years.
Moreover, there are signs of federal intervention in areas un-
touched by these decisions. For example, in Boykin v. Alabama,49 the
defendant had been indicted in Alabama on five counts of common-
law robbery, a crime punishable by death. Represented as an indigent
by court appointed counsel, he pleaded guilty to all five counts, and
was sentenced to death by the jury. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that a guilty plea must be supported on the record by an
affirmative showing that it was intelligently and voluntarily made. As
the trial judge had accepted Boykin's plea without probing into the
record, and as Boykin had not addressed the court at the time, proof
that the plea was made with full understanding of its effect was lack-
ing. Both the majority50 and dissenting51 opinions clearly indicate that
the duty of the state judge in accepting a guilty plea is precisely the
same as that of a federal judge under rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.52 Thus, Boykin may be the harbinger of an ex-
44 An aspect of this problem, frequently forgotten, is its effect on the prisoner. He
is compelled to use a procedure which shuttles him from court to court, and requires
him to file papers which he usually prepares in longhand, in a form replete with legal
verbiage and bound by rules not easily understood by laymen. From the point of view
of law as a consumer product, the process cannot be defended, except as a kind of therapy.
Cf. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 498 (1969). See also Cahn, Law in the Consumer
Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1 (1963).
45Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 US. 510, reh'g denied, 393 US. 898 (1968).
46 Long v. District Court, 385 US. 192 (1966). Moreover, a transcript of the hearing
must be furnished for use on a subsequent petition to an appellate court. Gardner v.
California, 393 US. 567 (1969).
47 Benton v. Maryland, 395 US. 784 (1969).
48 Bruton v. United States, 391 US. 123 (1968).
49 395 US. 238 (1969).
ao Id. at 243.
M Id. at 245.
52 FED. R. CiuM. P. 11. In substance, rule 11 provides that the court shall not accept
a plea of guilty "without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that
[VOL. 44:660
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plicit form of uniform criminal procedure impressed upon the states
through the federal rules.
Should Boykin be applied retroactively, it is certain to invite peti-
tions for post-conviction relief in the myriad of cases in which convic-
tions resulted from guilty pleas. The doctrine quite clearly calls for
the evaluation of the record at the time of the acceptance of the plea,
and where it is deficient under the standards of rule 1 l,53 an eviden-
tiary hearing may be required. Accordingly, the work load of both
state and federal courts may be expected to increase as a result of the
Boykin doctrine.
A second area of potential intervention appears from the decision
of United States ex rel. Herrington v. Mancusi," wherein the relators
challenged, by habeas corpus, the subject matter jurisdiction of the
New York Supreme Court, contending that the crimes of which
they were accused -in one case murder for the slaying of the relator's
mother-in-law, and, in the second, sodomy and incest committed against
the relator's daughter - were, under New York law, within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the Family Court. This lack of jurisdiction, ac-
cording to their petitions, violated their federal right of due process.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, although affirming
the denial of their applications, acknowledged the entry of the relators'
claim into a new aspect of federalism. The opinion by Chief Judge
Lumbard stated that no federal court had ever granted a writ on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction which resulted solely from the provi-
sions of a state statute.5 5 It should be noted that the court did not re-
fuse to intervene because of the delicacy of the relationship between
the two systems. Rather, it sustained the denial of relief on the conclu-
sion that the state law, as presently construed by state courts, did not
so clearly establish the lack of jurisdiction as to justify intervention.
Thus, the critical factor in the decision was not the court's lack of
power, but the absence of a clear base for the exercise of that power.
the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the
consequences of the plea"; moreover, it may not enter judgment on the guilty plea unless
there is a factual basis for the plea. Prior to 1969, it had been held that the failure of
the court to comply strictly with the rule would not invalidate the plea. Stephens v.
United States, 376 F.2d 23 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 US. 881 (1967). In McCarthy v.
United States, 394 US. 459 (1969), it was held that a guilty plea accepted without com-
pliance in every respect to the rule must be set aside. McCarthy was said not to be
retroactive in Halliday v. United States, 394 US. 831, reh'g denied, 395 US. 971 (1969).
53 For the substance of a record that is sufficient under federal standards, see Baker
v. United States, 404 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1968); cf. Hulsey v. United States, 369 F.2d 284
(5th Cir. 1966).
54415 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1969).
55 Id. at 209.
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It remains open, therefore, for the federal courts to enforce state
law on the issue of jurisdiction, even though state courts may decline
to grant relief on that ground.
V
Although grounds of tension, arising from the doctrines ex-
pounded as incidents to the invocation of federal habeas corpus relief,
may be present in the federal-state court relationship, that does not
mean that the tension is inevitable, or that it may not be lessened by
appropriate actions of the courts in both systems. There is, first, the
necessity for each to recognize and respect the duties and functions of
the other. These differ and reflect factors of varying value in the consti-
tutional scheme, which can, and should, not only be reconciled but also
harmonized.
The authors of the Federal Constitution constructed a pattern of
separate yet concurrent divisions of power. Generally, the enforcement
of criminal law was charged to the states, while the federal courts had
cognizance of conduct conceived to be inimical to federal power; but
the jurisdiction also encompassed federal constitutional rights since
these transcended state boundaries and hence received final embodi-
ment in the federal system. When the vindication of a federal right
impinges on state criminal process, the state's enforcement of that right
must be, as a matter of definition, the subject of federal scrutiny; other-
wise, the federal right conceivably could be subject to conflicting in-
terpretations, thus rendering equal protection an empty concept. Yet,
the determination of the facts is a matter over which the state judicial
system ought to have a preemptive authority.
It is in this context that the federal system's function to define
and enforce federal rights must, perforce, be acknowledged by the state
courts; and it should be beyond dispute that the content of those rights
may expand or contract as the Supreme Court faces novel circum-
stances requiring a new perspective. Conversely, the function of the
state system generally to enforce the criminal law must be acknowl-
edged by the federal courts, and the more advantageous position of
the state forums to make findings of fact should not be disrupted by
the parallel action of the federal courts with the resultant possibility
of inconsistent findings.5 6
56 But see Note, Supreme Court Review of State Court Findings of Fact, 55 HAnv. L.
REv. 644 (1942). The review of state findings of fact in criminal cases occurred in full
force in Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), although the rule was tempered in
Lisenba v. California, 314 US. 219, 238 (1941), so that review was said to be permissible
in the face of conflicting evidence in the state court only where the finding was so
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The accommodation of the functions of the dual systems can be
achieved by means of several approaches; all of which have the capacity
to dissolve the tension which may be precipitated whenever the two
systems in turn confront the disposition of the same case.
1. State courts in deciding applications for post-conviction relief
should state briefly the grounds relied on by the prisoner and the rea-
sons for denial. This does not require that the court write an opinion
or expatiate at length on the reasons for denial. The statement of the
grounds urged by the prisoner provides courts (whether federal or
state) passing on subsequent applications of the prisoner with informa-
tion which facilitates the disposition of the claims presented. If the
state court denies the petition without explanation, the inference may
be that it was based on the merits, even though it may actually have
been denied for failure of the prisoner to comply with procedural
rules.57 Moreover, a statement of the grounds for the application fur-
nishes the background for a comparison of various petitions made by
the prisoner in his repetitive assaults on the conviction.
2. The federal and state systems should collaborate in the estab-
lishment of a data bank which would contain the history of the pris-
oner's applications in both systems. Upon the referral of a pending
application to the data bank, a chronicle of the prisoner's applications
would be disclosed - indicating the grounds upon which they were
brought, their disposition, and the reasons assigned thereto. Efforts
have already been directed toward the organization of such a central
index.
In New York, for example, the State Judicial Conference and the
Federal Regional Conference (Second Circuit) have appointed joint
committees composed of state and federal judges to study the structure
of a data bank for precisely such a purpose. The committee has ap-
proved the establishment of this device and has prepared a form detail-
ing the required information to be forwarded to the data bank by the
court after it has decided a prisoner's application for post-conviction
relief. The data bank has been operative since July 1, 1970.
The information available from the data bank should materially
reduce the time and research of courts in the consideration of applica-
tions of a repetitive petitioner.
lacking in support in the record that to give the finding effect would result in funda-
mental unfairness.
57 Castro v. Kilinger, 373 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1947), requires a federal district judge to
assume, when a state court has denied a petition without indicating the reason, that the
denial was on the merits.
1970]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
3. The federal courts should give effect to the position of the
state courts as fact finders by requiring that evidentiary hearings, so
far as practicable, be held in the state courts. Certain pragmatic advan-
tages accrue from such a procedure. The state records will be more
accessible in the state courts, and witnesses will presumably not be re-
quired to travel as far as they would if their testimony were to be
received in the federal courts.
Beyond these advantages, the procedure has the benefit of tacitly
recognizing the authority of the state courts by minimizing potential
interference in their work, while simultaneously introducing them
into the habeas corpus process. Furthermore, it relieves the federal
system of lengthy hearings, and places the burden upon the state courts
where it properly belongs.
This is not to say that the federal courts are surrendering their
jurisdiction to the state system. As has been noted, the ultimate re-
sponsibility of determining federal rights must lie with the federal
courts. The fact finding referral to the state courts would still be at
the direction and under the broad supervision of the federal courts.
Some federal courts have already invoked the procedure. For ex-
ample, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has affirmed the
denial of habeas corpus relief without prejudice to an application to
the state court, on the theory that state mechanisms should be more
fully employed. 58 The use of this practice on a wider scale would reduce
duplication of effort, and foster greater cooperation between the two
systems.
4. The number of petitions for habeas corpus relief could be
decreased by the discriminating application of the doctrine of retro-
activity. As noted previously,59 a Supreme Court decision mandating
the absorption of a federal constitutional right into the state criminal
law stimulates a flood of petitions by state prisoners whose convictions
antedated the pronouncement. Since the state courts were unaware of
the necessity of vindicating the federal riglt at the time the prisoner
was tried and convicted (and the conviction reviewed), the retroactive
enforcement of the right has always carried a measure of frustration.
This is not to advocate a doctrine which totally rejects the concept
of retroactivity. The distinction may be drawn, however, in the quality
58 Peters v. Rutledge, 397 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1968); Milton v. Wainwright, 396 F.2d
214 (5th Cir. 1968). The same court has also granted habeas corpus relief, unless the
state court permits an out-of-time appeal, thus escaping the dilemma posed by Fay v.
Noia. Beto v. Martin, 396 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1968).
59 See text accompanying notes 39-42 supra.
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of federal rights in each particular case. Some rights, as, for example,
those specified in the fourth amendment, are truly immunities - a pro-
tection for the individual against oppressive actions by the state. Thus,
the vindication of the right (or immunity) deters its continued viola-
tion by vacating the conviction of the person asserting the claim. Under
this standard, the issue of whether a crime was committed is not rele-
vant. Here, retroactivity should be limited to cases still in the appellate
process and not extended to habeas corpus relief.
But where the violation of the right substantially affects the issue
of guilt - as in the cases of the denial of counsel or the inadequacy of
the representation by counsel - it would seem unfair not to grant
retroactivity.6 0
The doctrine, not constitutionally mandated,61 has not been ac-
corded consistent treatment in the area of the absorption of federal
rights. By way of illustration, although the assertion of the exclu-
sionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio62 was not followed by retroactivity,63 the
rule in Miranda v. Arizona64 was accompanied by a limited retro-
activity, i.e., only to those defendants whose trial had not commenced.65
Since both the right to be protected against illegal search and seizure
and the right against incrimination in the absence of proper warning
are immunities which are designed to safeguard the individual against
unconstitutional investigatory methods, neither should have been
given retroactive application under the analysis of the effect the viola-
tion had on guilt. On the other hand, the right to be confronted under
proper precautions by witnesses for the purpose of identification would
seem to relate directly to the question of guilt. Yet that right was not
afforded retroactive application.6
The latest statement from the Supreme Court on this thorny sub-
ject suggests that the guilt-determining process may at last be the
touchstone by which retroactive effect is determined. In Desist v.
United States,67 the Court denied retroactivity to the rule announced
in Katz v. United States"8 that the fourth amendment, binding on the
states, embraced eavesdropping -a result consistent with the refusal
60 See Mishkin, Foreward, the Supreme Court, 1964 Term, the High Court, the
Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HAv. L. REV. 56 (1965).
61 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
02 267 US. 643 (1961).
63 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 US. 618, 629 (1965).
64 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
63Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
66 Stovall v. Denno, 288 U.S. 293 (1967).
67 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
68 389 U.S. 247 (1967).
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to grant retroactivity to Mapp v. Ohio. In considering the problem,
the Court said that three factors controlled the solution: (1) the pur-
pose to be served by the new standards; (2) the extent of reliance by
the authorities on the previous rule; and (3) the effect of retroactivity
on the administration of justice.69 Though the second factor may be
irrelevant to the distinction resting upon the validity of the fact-
finding process determining guilt or innocence, surely the other two
factors are inextricably woven into that distinction.
It is submitted that the integrity of the fact-finding process should
be, in the end, the standard by which retroactivity ought to be deter-
mined. By limiting retroactivity under this analysis the number of
habeas corpus petitions would be materially decreased.
5. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the possibility of ten-
sion between the two systems can be lessened by opening the channels
of communication. Noteworthy here have been the joint committees
created by the New York Judicial Conference and the Second Circuit
Regional Conference with respect to the establishment of a data bank.
The Federal Judicial Center, under the direction of former Mr.
Justice Clark, has sponsored a study at William and Mary Law School,
under the supervision of an advisory committee of both federal and
state judges, to investigate the hypothesis that refusals by the federal
courts to intervene in state convictions depend on the adequacy of post-
conviction remedies in the states. In the Ninth Circuit, conferences be-
tween state and federal judges are held for the purpose of discussing
mutual problems. In Minnesota, informal meetings of federal district
judges and state judges have taken place.
The extension of this kind of closer relationship and direct com-
munication throughout the circuits would undoubtedly promote a
better understanding and a higher degree of acceptance of the roles of
each system in the administration of the criminal law. It is hoped that
the Federal Judicial Center, which is already studying problems arising
in both systems,70 will broaden the channels of intercommunication
by sponsoring regional conferences of federal and state judges at which
the acute points of pressure inducing tension can be objectively and
candidly examined.
VI
It is surely an ideal of criminal law that it be enforced evenly
within the system. Like other ideals, it may not be capable of full re-
69 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 297 (1967).
70 For example, the law center is involved in the examination of procedures for dis-
cipline of state and federal judges.
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alization, but at least the system should have the power to obtain
compliance with its standards, so that the ideal will be approached. As
the national structure admits of two coexisting systems, the ideal still
remains, but under two auspices. The individual case, in which federal
constitutional rights are asserted, tests the compatibility of the systems,
and the accommodation of the procedures in the systems must be a
necessary objective, if both systems are to survive.71
During the last twenty years, the function of the federal courts as
an instrument of achieving the equal protection of constitutional
rights throughout the nation has expanded enormously. The function
of the state courts has accordingly been altered, and this has brought
about adjustments in the two systems. While a period of adjustment
is usually a period of tension, this is by no means inevitable. If the
two systems are willing to recognize the appropriate function of each
and to make adjustments in response thereto, the underlying causes
of frustration can be eliminated. The suggestions made here do not
exhaust the range of the adjustments which in fact can be made; they
merely furnish a starting point from which other and more inventive
devices can be launched.
71 The federal judiciary has been keenly aware of the criticisms made concerning
the use of habeas corpus and have considered recommendations for change. See, e.g., Lay,
Problems of Federal Habeas Corpus Involving State Prisoners, 45 F.R.D. 45 (1968); Ap-
plications for Writs of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Review of Sentence in the
United States Courts, 33 F.R.D. 363 (1963).
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